In Retrospect is a linear history of the Vietnam War told from the perspective of its author, then-Secretary of Defence Robert S. McNamara. It covers from the beginning of the conflict in 1961 through to McNamara’s departure from the government in 1968. It aims to present the Vietnam War as the American government saw it unfold, and by contrasting that perspective with a retrospective view of reality it tries to highlight the lessons that can be drawn from Vietnam. These lessons that it presents are threefold: first, that America must temper its judgement with that of allied nations and avoid unilateral engagements. Second, we must understand the limits imposed on us by others and by ourselves, and be prepared to withdraw if victory cannot be achieved within those limits. Third, we must avoid large-scale military engagements unless the nation is directly threatened. The strength of the book lies in the way it presents the information seen by the administration at the moment in question and invites the reader to form their own decision on the proper course of action. This can then be compared with the historical decision that was made at that time, which is in turn compared with the information that was unavailable or overlooked to see what path was best. The entire process is very engaging and rewarding, and is very effective in supporting the aforementioned goal of learning from the mistakes of Vietnam. Obviously any historical work will have some amount of unavoidable bias. What is interesting in this case is the personal connection to the events being presented. McNamara occasionally allows his nostalgia and personal opinions interfere with the analysis of history, such as his rather baseless claims that John F. Kennedy (a close friend to McNamara) would have withdrawn from Vietnam quite quickly. For such a controversial figure, however, McNamara succeeds in relaying much of Vietnam that neither overly criticises nor sugar-coats the administration. McNamara’s weakness lies in the final analysis he presents based on the complete picture, which can often come across as vague or superficial, such as his statements on the “failure to organize... the executive branch” (McNamara 323). Such conclusions seem unnecessarily obvious and lack enough constructive criticism to assist in solving the problems they describe. This flaw, however, is offset by the aforementioned strength of analysis that the reader is able to present when given the facts by such an effective structure. While McNamara’s judgements may not be particularly astute, he provides the tools for the reader to construct their own criticisms, which is in itself a very rewarding exercise. In Retrospect is an essential book for any historian, from the casual to the professional. While it may not bring to light very many new facts for the dedicated students of Vietnam, it has the added facet of providing all the mistakes that occurred in the war with their proper political and diplomatic context. I hesitate to call it justification, but McNamara’s commentary on the inner workings of the American government at such a pivotal moment in history is both original and fascinating.
In Retrospect is a linear history of the Vietnam War told from the perspective of its author, then-Secretary of Defence Robert S. McNamara. It covers from the beginning of the conflict in 1961 through to McNamara’s departure from the government in 1968. It aims to present the Vietnam War as the American government saw it unfold, and by contrasting that perspective with a retrospective view of reality it tries to highlight the lessons that can be drawn from Vietnam. These lessons that it presents are threefold: first, that America must temper its judgement with that of allied nations and avoid unilateral engagements. Second, we must understand the limits imposed on us by others and by ourselves, and be prepared to withdraw if victory cannot be achieved within those limits. Third, we must avoid large-scale military engagements unless the nation is directly threatened.
ReplyDeleteThe strength of the book lies in the way it presents the information seen by the administration at the moment in question and invites the reader to form their own decision on the proper course of action. This can then be compared with the historical decision that was made at that time, which is in turn compared with the information that was unavailable or overlooked to see what path was best. The entire process is very engaging and rewarding, and is very effective in supporting the aforementioned goal of learning from the mistakes of Vietnam.
Obviously any historical work will have some amount of unavoidable bias. What is interesting in this case is the personal connection to the events being presented. McNamara occasionally allows his nostalgia and personal opinions interfere with the analysis of history, such as his rather baseless claims that John F. Kennedy (a close friend to McNamara) would have withdrawn from Vietnam quite quickly. For such a controversial figure, however, McNamara succeeds in relaying much of Vietnam that neither overly criticises nor sugar-coats the administration.
McNamara’s weakness lies in the final analysis he presents based on the complete picture, which can often come across as vague or superficial, such as his statements on the “failure to organize... the executive branch” (McNamara 323). Such conclusions seem unnecessarily obvious and lack enough constructive criticism to assist in solving the problems they describe. This flaw, however, is offset by the aforementioned strength of analysis that the reader is able to present when given the facts by such an effective structure. While McNamara’s judgements may not be particularly astute, he provides the tools for the reader to construct their own criticisms, which is in itself a very rewarding exercise.
In Retrospect is an essential book for any historian, from the casual to the professional. While it may not bring to light very many new facts for the dedicated students of Vietnam, it has the added facet of providing all the mistakes that occurred in the war with their proper political and diplomatic context. I hesitate to call it justification, but McNamara’s commentary on the inner workings of the American government at such a pivotal moment in history is both original and fascinating.