In “The Longest Day”, Ryan aims to provide a concise chronology of the events of D-Day. He argues that the Allied landings battered the Germans, who emerged as a weakened fighting force – leading directly to their defeat eleven months later. He often blames officers behind the lines for blunders; from inept allied planners who chose poor airborne landing zones, to German “desk generals” who initially thought the invasion was a diversion or otherwise failed to take appropriate action, such as releasing reserves. Few behind the lines are safe from criticism. Conversely, he praises the troops on the ground, on both sides, for their conduct. Notable examples include German Major Werner Pluskatt for being ready for the invasion his superiors claimed wasn’t coming that morning, and American Colonel Benjamin Vandervoort for capturing the town of Ste Mere-Eglise after fracturing his ankle in a botched airborne landing that left his regiment scattered across Normandy.
The book provides an excellent account of the overall picture, and matches the generally accepted view of the event, making it an excellent read. Its heavy reliance upon interviews with important participants helps make it an unsurpassed research material.
However, I feel it is too harsh on the Germans. Ryan argues few were in control of the situation by the day’s end. The last chapters are filled with accounts of soldiers mentally breaking down, fanatics sacrificing themselves, and pointless attacks against impossible odds merely to save face. According to most modern schools of thought, by the end of the day the Germans were much better organized from a situational standpoint than at the beginning. Ryan argues just the opposite – that the confusion was compounded throughout the day. While I don’t feel this is accurate, it may be what he grasped from interviews with the participants. If this is the case, I still believe it has been taken too far. There is very little criticism of the Allies; when describing the execution of a group of German POWs, he merely mentions how one sailor was sickened by the sight.
This book has become known as one of the best on D-Day, and I think rightfully so. Although having its faults, if one reads it with a relatively open mind, it can greatly strengthen your understanding of the event. It’s worth reading just for its eyewitness accounts alone, and I highly recommend it to anyone looking for a good read.
In “The Longest Day”, Ryan aims to provide a concise chronology of the events of D-Day. He argues that the Allied landings battered the Germans, who emerged as a weakened fighting force – leading directly to their defeat eleven months later. He often blames officers behind the lines for blunders; from inept allied planners who chose poor airborne landing zones, to German “desk generals” who initially thought the invasion was a diversion or otherwise failed to take appropriate action, such as releasing reserves. Few behind the lines are safe from criticism. Conversely, he praises the troops on the ground, on both sides, for their conduct. Notable examples include German Major Werner Pluskatt for being ready for the invasion his superiors claimed wasn’t coming that morning, and American Colonel Benjamin Vandervoort for capturing the town of Ste Mere-Eglise after fracturing his ankle in a botched airborne landing that left his regiment scattered across Normandy.
ReplyDeleteThe book provides an excellent account of the overall picture, and matches the generally accepted view of the event, making it an excellent read. Its heavy reliance upon interviews with important participants helps make it an unsurpassed research material.
However, I feel it is too harsh on the Germans. Ryan argues few were in control of the situation by the day’s end. The last chapters are filled with accounts of soldiers mentally breaking down, fanatics sacrificing themselves, and pointless attacks against impossible odds merely to save face. According to most modern schools of thought, by the end of the day the Germans were much better organized from a situational standpoint than at the beginning. Ryan argues just the opposite – that the confusion was compounded throughout the day. While I don’t feel this is accurate, it may be what he grasped from interviews with the participants. If this is the case, I still believe it has been taken too far. There is very little criticism of the Allies; when describing the execution of a group of German POWs, he merely mentions how one sailor was sickened by the sight.
This book has become known as one of the best on D-Day, and I think rightfully so. Although having its faults, if one reads it with a relatively open mind, it can greatly strengthen your understanding of the event. It’s worth reading just for its eyewitness accounts alone, and I highly recommend it to anyone looking for a good read.
By Alan